This paper aims to address three issues: the lack of literature differentiating terrorism and violent extremist organizations (VEOs), terrorism incident databases, and the applicability of Risk Terrain Modeling (RTM) to terrorism. Current open source literature and publicly available government sources do not differentiate between terrorism and VEOs; furthermore, they fail to define them. Addressing the lack of a comprehensive comparison of existing terrorism data sources, a matrix comparing a dozen terrorism databases is constructed, providing insight toward the array of data available. RTM, a method for spatial risk analysis at a micro level, has some applicability to terrorism research, particularly for studies looking at risk indicators of terrorism. Leveraging attack data from multiple databases, combined with RTM, offers one avenue for closing existing research gaps in terrorism literature.
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Introduction
Terrorist attacks continue to occur as multiple groups thrive in certain regions across the world. The prevalence of terrorism, coupled with the serious attention it demands from governments, creates an incentive for academics and researchers to study terrorism. Despite this proliferation of studies, there are significant gaps in research that need to be addressed. Both government policies and extant literature attempt to address violent extremism and terrorism in the same frame. Official definitions of violent extremism are scarce. Differentiation between terrorism and violent extremism is examined, along with the difference between counterterrorism and countering violent extremism.
This paper contributed to complementary work focused on how geographic features influence terror targets and how their spatiotemporal changes could help forecast the growth or emergence of new terror activity (see Chatterjee and Fortin 2016; Johansen 2016) . The group selection section addresses the four countries and individual terror groups examined in that project; detailed profiles of each terror group are provided in Appendix A. Nearly all quantitative studies of terrorism rely on a database that covers terrorist events, yet there are major discrepancies between databases. These discrepancies, based on scope, geographic region, years covered, and the definition of terrorism used, greatly affect the results of associated studies. This paper attempts to address these inconsistencies by creating a matrix comparing the basic information of a dozen terrorism databases. A qualitative summary of each database is included to provide context to their discrepancies. Finally, an approach to spatial risk analysis, Risk Terrain Modeling (RTM), is evaluated on its applicability to terrorism. Originally designed for crime analysis, the approach has potential for determining higher risk areas for terrorism following the development of risk indicators that are proven to increase the likelihood of terrorism.
Background
Terrorism and Violent Extremist Organizations
Numerous definitions of terrorism exist, with little consensus on what constitutes a terrorist attack or organization. Definitions differ between academic, international, and government communities for two reasons: (1) terrorism is a pejorative term with no universal definition and (2) each community tends to adopt a definition that reflects their particular priorities and interests (Hoffman 2006) . These definitions can differ between departments within the same government, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the State Department. For the purposes of this paper, we will use the definition of terrorism provided by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) for the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). They define a terrorist attack as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social good through fear, coercion, or intimidation" (START 2016) . This definition was selected due to the widespread use of the GTD throughout the project; it provides the coding basis for attacks and drives the inclusion criteria. Including the threatened use of force in the definition creates a broad range of attacks that are categorized as terrorism.
Defining violent extremism is a more complex task compared to defining terrorism. Little research exists differentiating the two, with violent extremism and terrorism often used interchangeably. It is more helpful to compare definitions from similar federal agencies. The FBI defines terrorism as the "unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, a civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social goal" (National Institute for Justice 2011). The FBI defines violent extremism as "encouraging, condoning, justifying, or supporting the commission of a violent act to achieve political, ideological, religious, social, or economic goals" (FBI n.d.) . Furthermore, the FBI states, "more than 50 violent extremist groups around the world have been named terrorist organizations by the U.S. government," and lists six examples: al-Qaeda, alShabaab, Hizballah, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Kahane Chai, and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (FBI n.d.) . Three of these examples, FARC, ISIL, and ISIL-Libya by extension, are terrorist organizations profiled in this report. It would be reasonable to assume that Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which follows an extremist interpretation of Islam, would also fall into the FBI's list of violent extremist organizations (VEOs).
While there is a significant lack of extant literature seeking to differentiate between terrorism and violent extremism, some authors have tackled the challenge. Nasser-Eddine et al. (2011) discovered through their examination of countering violent extremism (CVE) literature that definitions for both violent extremism and CVE are viewed as self-evident. Lake (2002) differentiated the purpose of violent extremism as provoking the target into "a disproportionate response, radicalize moderates and build support for its objectives in the long term, while the purpose of terrorism is to endogenize the capabilities of both the terrorists and the target." Mroz (2009) explained violent extremism as "violence in the absence of reason, or rather, the belief that committing an act of violence will produce benefits that outweigh the cost of human life. Violent extremism is homicide, genocide, fratricide, and, yes, it can also be terrorism." Mroz (2009) The difference between counter policies appears clear: CVE focuses on preventing radicalization and recruitment of potential followers, while counterterrorism focuses on eliminating terrorists and their organizations. Yet, the explanation for this difference is not nearly as apparent. One could simply attribute the differences to the distinct priorities of each contributor. Given its policy goals as a government institution, the State Department would naturally push forward a policy aimed at preventing radicalization. This falls in line with the FBI's online CVE campaign, called "Don't Be a Puppet." The campaign aims to educate how people become violent extremists, how they make contact, and how to avoid becoming radicalized (FBI n.d.) . On the other hand, the JCS focuses more exclusively on military operations and policies. Therefore, a counterterrorism definition involving the neutralization of terrorists and their organizations fits their mission.
In the context of counterterrorism and CVE strategies, the two differing approaches by the JCS and FBI are distinguished as hard and soft power. Hard power mechanisms include military, financial incentives, economic sanctions, and legal options (Aly et al. 2015) . The JCS' counterterrorism policy fits under hard power. Soft power encompasses a broader range of instruments that seek to improve relations between states or fuel desired social change. Aly et al. (2015) provides more nuance toward the relationship between counterterrorism and CVE. They associate CVE with the soft side of counterterrorism, and loosely define CVE as "measures that target the root cause of terrorism at the societal level". The conceptual shift from hard-focused counterterrorism to CVE is rooted in CVE strategies becoming more focused on prevention rather than responding to violent extremism (Aly et al. 2015 ; Nasser-Eddine 2011). -Hogan et al. (2015) confirms this view, noting that CVE has become a popular term used by governments and academics to refer to non-coercive attempts to reduce involvements in terrorism. They note CVE activities evolved from counter-radicalization policies, defined by the United Nations as "deterring disaffected (and possibly already radicalized) individuals from crossing the line and becoming terrorists". This supports the ambiguity of CVE policies, with CVE evolving into a catchall category that lacks precision and focus (Harris-Hogan et al. 2015) . 
Harris
Risk Terrain Modeling
RTM is an approach to spatial risk analysis that was invented by Les Kennedy and Joel Caplan, and has been developed in collaboration with Eric Piza (RTM n.d.). Initially, this approach was created to identify risk features of a landscape or geographic space and model how they co-locate to create unique behavior settings for crime. Since its inauguration, RTM has been adapted to many uses other than studying crime, including injury prevention, public health, epidemiology, border security, pollution, and maritime piracy. RTM provides a simple analogy to explain how it works:
Consider a place where children repeatedly play. RTM assumes that all places are risky to some extent, but due to the spatial influences of some crimes, certain locations are much riskier than others (Caplan et al. 2013) . Risky places are the product of vulnerability and exposure. They are defined as:
… a function of the combined effect of (1) (Caplan et al. 2013) . This allows for analysis at the block or half-block level. Forecasting risky locations for crime must incorporate both spatial vulnerabilities and exposures at micro places to yield efficient and actionable spatial intelligence (Caplan and Kennedy 2016) .
The RTM process begins by selecting factors of various weights that are geographically related to crime incidents. The final model displays places where criminal behavior is statistically most likely to occur (RTM n.d.) . The changing of weights and indicators allows for dynamic analysis of unique locations, instead of trying to fit a set pattern of crime across jurisdictions. Caplan and Kennedy (2016) provide an example of how the mapping process works by looking at robberies in Kansas City. They model the jurisdiction as a grid of 462-foot (the average block length in Kansas City) by 462-foot cells, with each cell representing a place. To determine the optimal spatial influence of each risky feature, they define 30 potential risk factors of the Kansas City landscape across several maps. For each risk factor, they measure whether each cell in the grid was within 462, 924, or 1386 feet of a feature point (approximately one block, two blocks, or three blocks), or in an area of high density of the feature points based on a kernel density bandwidth of 462, 924, or 1386 feet. They then empirically select risk factors for inclusion into the final model. Their results showed that 14 of the initial 30 risk factors were spatially related to robbery incidents in the city.
The RTM website (www.riskterrainmodeling.com), run by its founders Caplan and Kennedy, contains a number of resources for learning and conducting RTM. Multiple free publications are available, along with a number of other publications that require paid access. These include books, book chapters, journal articles, downloadable PDFs, working papers, reports, research briefs, literature reviews, conjunctive analysis, conferences and abstracts, and other selected recommended readings. Caplan and Kennedy offer their own software for conducting RTM, called RTMDx. They offer three versions of the software: Educational, geared toward students and educators, is free but does not output maps; Professional, which requires purchase of a single-end user license and outputs GeoTiff maps; and Project Partners, a professional version that can be customized with speaking, training, presentation, or research engagements. They provide a free user manual, available on their website, which provides detailed explanations on operating the software.
Country and Terror Group Selection
This section supports a complementary project with goals to use statistical methods for estimating terrorist risks (see Chatterjee and Fortin 2016; Johansen 2016) . Selection of the countries and terrorist organizations to examine for the project included the following factors:
• Geographic diversity
The selection process needed to focus on a diverse range of countries, leading us to select countries from four distinct regions: South America, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. The process then diverged within each region, based on unique factors of the countries and terrorist organizations within those countries. Attacks within the selected country needed to cluster in small, distinct areas. Tight clustering holds a twofold benefit: the necessary amount of data on infrastructure would be smaller than a broader range of attacks and allows the geospatial analysis to observe attacks from a higher resolution. Furthermore, there needed to be some diversity among selected groups. This pertains not just to ideology, but also the group's longevity; a mature group and an emerging group needed to be included. Creating diversity in both the regions and groups examined allows for trends of attacks and risks to be compared. After evaluating the necessary criteria, four terrorist organizations were selected: FARC in Colombia, ISIL in Iraq, LeT in India, and ISIL in Libya. Detailed profiles of each group are provided in Appendix A. 
South America: Colombia -Revolutionary Armed Force of Colombia
Colombia is home to the one of the only active terrorist organizations in South America. FARC is a mature terrorist organization that has been conducting attacks since 1964 (START PVC 2015a). Furthermore, their Leftist ideology differentiates them from the majority of high-profile terrorist organizations, which tend to be Salafi Jihadists. Despite recently coming to terms on a ceasefire and peace agreement with the Colombian government, it is likely that spoilers will factionalize from the main group to continue attacks. One FARC guerilla unit, the First Front, announced it would refuse any eventual order to lay down arms (InSight Crime 2016). 
Middle East: Iraq -Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
Africa: Libya -Islamic State of Iraq in Libya
Africa contains several countries where major terrorist organizations operate. While the top two terrorist groups, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab, would be attractive choices, more diversity among group selection is necessary. An emerging terrorist organization would provide us with a broader sample of attacks to compare against more established groups. The ISIL branch in Libya (known as ISIL-Libya) formed in November 2014, with at least three distinct groups having declared their affiliation with ISIL: Barqa in the east, Tripolitania in the west, and Fezzan in the south desert. The Barqa Province and Tripoli Province have committed nearly all their attacks in 2015, conducting a combined 199 attacks versus just nine in 2014 (GTD 2015) . The Fezzan Province committed only three attacks during that period, so it will not be included during the analysis. The attacks by the Barqa Province primarily cluster in the eastern coastal cities of Benghazi, Derna, and Ajdabiya. The attacks by the Tripoli Province cluster around Surt (ISILLibya's headquarters) and Tripoli, the capital (GTD 2015).
Asia: India -Lashkar-e-Taiba
Within the Asian continent, Pakistan and India are subject to a high number of terrorist attacks. While Pakistan experiences a higher number of attacks, the attacks in India tend to be more focused, especially on a group basis (GTD 2015 
Database Matrix
Databases containing detailed records of terrorist attacks provide a valuable resource for conducting terrorism research. However, variations in databases can significantly influence terrorism studies, creating potential for incorrect results. Using a database as a count measure for attacks can also lead to varying numbers, based on collection methodologies and definitions of terrorism. A comparison of any open source, publically available databases is necessary to ensure researchers and policymakers alike know the differences between databases. The selection criteria compare a number of factors: total number of incidents, years covered, geography, access availability, and unit of analysis. Outside of the matrix, each database will be evaluated qualitatively. Schmid (2011) reviewed several of these databases. This work updates the information on several of those databases, and adds new contributions while eliminating defunct databases. The matrix is organized by geographic region, and then by total number of incidents within those regions. 
Matrix
Database Summaries
While the matrix provides a quantitative comparison of the databases, a brief qualitative look at each can provide greater insight to their differences. Arguably, the most important is the definition of terrorism. That definition becomes the foundation that drives the coding of attacks and is the primary reason for the widespread differences in reported incidents. These descriptions also provide other useful information: the parent host, URL, and principal sources used. 
Global Terrorism Database
Access: Free
Scope: Global
Unit of Analysis:
Terrorism incident
Principal Sources:
Publicly available open source material
The GTD is one of the most comprehensive databases of terrorist attacks available online. It was created in 2007 and began by computerizing data from the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service, which spanned from 1970 to 1990 (Lafree and Dugan 2007) . Because the goal of the Pinkerton database was to provide risk assessment to corporate customers, the database was designed to err toward inclusiveness (Lafree and Dugan 2007) . The GTD contains 156,773 attacks globally, spanning from 1970 to 2015, and covers both domestic and international terror attacks. Noted earlier, the GTD defines terrorism as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social good through fear, coercion, or intimidation" (START 2016) . This definition lends itself toward inclusiveness as well, given that the "threatened use" of violence is coded as an attack. The GTD also contains the most descriptive data regarding the attacks, with over 137 different variables. Attacks logged in the GTD were used as the basis for this project. 
RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents
Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism Suicide Attack Database
Access: Free
Scope: Global
Unit of Analysis:
Suicide attack
The CPOST-SAD contains data on suicide attacks from 1982 through 2015, a total of 4,933 attacks in over 40 countries. The database includes information about the location of attacks, target type, weapon used, and systematic information on the demographic and general biographical characteristics of suicide attackers. CPOST-SAD defines a suicide attack as "an attack in which an attacker kills himself or herself in a deliberate attempt to kill others." Furthermore, CPOST-SAD intentionally does not consider whether a suicide attack is terrorism or not, due to the difficulty of defining terrorism. Instead, all suicide attacks must be committed by a non-state actor; attacks authorized by national governments are not included. CPOST-SAD does not include failed suicide attacks where explosives do not detonate or are detonated by someone other than the attacker, or "suicide missions" where the attacker expects to be killed but does not take their own life (CPOST 2016). 
Right-wing Terrorism and Violence Database
Access: Free
Scope:
Western Europe
Unit of Analysis: Terrorist incident
The RTV dataset covers incidents of right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe from 1990 to 2015. The dataset was created by Jacob Ravndal, a doctoral candidate with the Center for Extremism Research at the University of Oslo. That dataset contains 578 incidents, of which 190 are considered deadly incidents, resulting in 303 deaths. As the number of violent incidents motived by right-wing beliefs is too large to be dealt with effectively, the RTV contains only the most severe types of attacks; such incidents are fewer in number and less likely to go unnoticed. The database lacks a definition of both terrorism and right-wing terrorism. Instead, it includes only violent incidents whose target selectionminority groups, political adversaries, or the government-is based on right-wing beliefs. It intentionally avoids distinguishing terror incidents from other types of incidents because of the inherently blurred nature of such attacks (Ravndal 2016) . (Schmid 2011) . For the purposes of the TWEED dataset, "terrorism is understood theoretically as a form of violence that uses targets of violence in an indirect way in order to influence third parties, audiences" (Engene 2007) . Given their abstract definition of terrorism, the criteria for an act of terrorism includes concrete events such as bombings, shootings, sieges, explosions, kidnappings, and other armed attacks (Schmid 2011 (Gibney et al. 2015) . Although the title implies a focus on political terrorism, it is more accurate to consider the database as a ranking of human rights violations in a state (Schmid 2011) . The term "terror" as used by the PTS, "refers to state-sanctioned killings, torture, disappearances, and political imprisonment" (Gibney et al. 2015) . This further differentiates it from the previous definitions and databases that all focus on non-state actors. 
International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events
Monterey WMD Terrorism Database
Access: Limited
Scope: Global
Unit of Analysis:
Incidents involving sub-state actors attempting to acquire or use WMDs
Principal Sources:
Open source material
The Monterey WMD Terrorism Database (MIIS 2016 ) is an open source catalog of worldwide incidents involving the acquisition, possession, threat, and use of WMDs by sub-state actors. The database is hosted by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies through MIIS. The database focuses on incidents related to the use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials as potential weapons. Sources used to compile the database include government documentation, media news services, unpublished material, academic journals, and non-English material, including documentation in German, Arabic, Russian, Chinese, and Korean (Schmid 2011) . Despite free access to the database, it is restricted to federal, state, and local government employees (MIIS 2016) . This restriction hinders its use for academic research, though it still has utility for use by policymakers.
The UCDP collects information on many aspects of armed violence since 1946, containing both quantitative and qualitative data sets (Gleditsch 2002) . The program allows researchers to access relevant data sets to conduct analysis on the origins of conflict, its dynamics, and resolutions (Schmid 2011) . Armed conflict, different from terrorism, is defined by the UCDP: "An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year" (Gleditsch 2002 ).
Armed conflict is considered a level of violence above terrorism due to the actors involved. Terrorism occurs between a non-state actor and a variety of actors, including civilians, infrastructure, government, and the military. Armed conflict requires government involvement against an actor, whether non-state or another government. Therefore, codification of terrorism as armed conflict occurs depending on target selection. The UCDP Armed Conflict data set confirms this; groups such as al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab, FARC, and ISIL are included. Key variables include location, year, incompatibility, side A (government in conflict), and side B (non-state actor or other government) (Schmid 2011) . Outside of the armed conflict data set, UCDP also offers data sets on actors, peace agreements, non-state conflict, battle-related deaths, and more.
Minorities at Risk Project
Name:
Minorities at Risk Project (MAR)
Host:
University of Maryland
URL:
http://www.mar.umd.edu/
Years Covered:
1945-2006
Access: Free
Scope: Global
Unit of Analysis:
Conflict between politically active communal groups
Principal Sources:
Open-source Material
The MAR project tracks conflicts of 284 politically active ethnic groups worldwide whose current population is at least 500,000 (MAR 2009; Schmid 2011) . MAR focuses specifically on ethnopolitical groups, non-state communal groups that have "political significance" in the contemporary world because of their status and political actions. MAR determines political significance through two criteria: "(1) the group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in society; (2) the group is the basis for political mobilization and collective action in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests." MAR groups are categorized as one of six types: ethnonationalist, indigenous, ethnoclass, communal contender, religious sect, and national minority (MAR 2009). A key aim of the MAR project is to provide researchers with standardized data, allowing for comparative studies and quantitative research across various conflicts (Schmid 2011). (Asal et al. 2008 ).
Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior
Challenges and Shortcomings
Schmid (2011) identifies seven major shortcomings with current open source terrorism databases: (1) one-sidedness, (2) under-reporting of failed and foiled attacks and threats, (3) under-reporting of political violence other than terrorism, (4) non-reporting of non-and not-violent activities of terrorists, (5) absence of monitoring of non-political, criminal intimidation, (6) absence of parallel systematic monitoring of terrorist communications, and (7) inadequate coverage of state or regime terrorism. While these are all valid concerns, some do not hold high relevancy toward terrorism research. Finding open source information on many of these shortcomings, such as non-violent activities, terrorist communications, and failed/foiled attacks, is nearly impossible. Furthermore, this information might misrepresent a terrorist group's activity levels by oversaturating databases with unnecessary events. As noted earlier, the last point is questionable due to the wide consensus that state terrorism does not exist (Hoffman 2006) . One valid concern is the difficultly of differentiating terrorism in interstate and intrastate war from acts of war and war crimes. This is evident by reporting difficulties in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Ross (2004) notes further drawbacks of databases: (1) there is no guarantee that the same stringent collection standards were used to develop each database, (2) there is no assurance that all the same variables were coded, (3) rarely is the reliability of the source material questioned or verified, and (4) there is no guarantee that data sets exist for all of the countries under investigation.
Despite these criticisms, Ross (2004) also notes the utility and succinct advantages these databases provide for terrorism research. Databases can help researchers determine trends, give us a better idea of who is committing terrorist acts, compile the types of terrorism that occur, and analyze how terrorism changes over time. Databases also allow researchers to test hypotheses in a quantitative manner and have primarily been used to aid descriptive research and recommendations for policy changes. Despite the drawbacks listed above, these datasets are necessary for the field of terrorism studies to move forward. In the future, better collection of open source data and coding methods will be developed, which will improve the study and modeling of terrorism and terrorism-related events.
Risk Terrain Modeling
Application to Terrorism
While RTM is being considered for topics other than crime, such as urban planning, border security, and maritime piracy, there is little current literature focused on the application of RTM to modeling terrorism.
The RTM website provides a list of risk factors for crime analysis and global threat topics, including murder, shootings, fragile states, and natural resources security, among others. The closest risk indicators they offer involve armed conflict. As noted earlier, armed conflict has some similarities to terrorism. Analyzing the geography of conflict zones uses two methodologies: the use of national-level data to proxy for individual social-economic and political characteristics, and the use of subnational-level data to directly reflect the local differences. National risk factors include economic growth, per capita income, country size, institutional consistency, governance, neighbor conflict, and environmental conditions. Subnational risk factors include distances to capital, borders, and valuable resources; density of population; minority language; rough terrain; and road infrastructure (Gaziarifoglu 2012) .
The national risk factors listed are common variables used to study both armed conflict and terrorism. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) conclude that slow economic growth is a robust predictor of conflict, while Fearon and Laitin (2003) suggest that per capita income is a significant indicator of civil wars (Gaziarifoglu 2012) . Both sources also conclude that in a country-level analysis among all correlates, country size is the most robust indicator of civil war (Gaziarifoglu 2012) . Numerous authors have confirmed that the degree of political stability is higher if there is a high degree of either democracy or autocracy, and states with a small degree of democracy and autocracy experience more armed conflict (Beetham 1991; Gaziarifoglu 2012; Goldstone et al. 2010) . Goldstone et al. (2010) also found that having four or more bordering states experiencing armed conflict increases the risk of political instability. Finally, a study by Hegre (2003) finds that mountainous countries have a higher risk of war than other countries.
Gaziarifoglu (2012) does not elaborate nearly as much on the subnational-level risk factors, instead just providing sources and a quick explanatory sentence. The subnational-level risk factors hold greater weight for RTM, featuring applicability to smaller scale analysis. The weight increases for observing terrorism, as terrorists tend to operate at a subnational level. Buhaug and Rød (2006) find support for a number of subnational risk factors looking at armed conflict in Africa from 1970-2001. They find territorial conflict is more likely in sparsely populated regions near the state border, at a distance from the capital, and without significant rough terrain, while conflict over state governance is more likely in regions that are densely populated and near the capital city (Buhaug and Rød 2006 The amount of quantitative research on terrorism pales in comparison to the number of qualitative studies, largely due to a lack of hard data (Ross 2004) . Statistical information specific to terrorism research is generally unavailable, inaccurate, dated, or limited to international or transnational events. The proliferation of terrorism databases, particularly the GTD, has provided some manner of codified data for use in quantitative studies; the most prevalent quantitative data being events data. The primary change in terrorist research over the last few decades has been an increase in attempts to use more sophisticated modeling, aided by the development of faster and cheaper computers and statistical programs. The strongest studies tend to use both methodologies, feature multiple empirical analyses, and include at least one qualitative and one quantitative study supporting the hypothesis.
RTM may provide an avenue for analyzing terrorism at the micro level, something that is difficult to accomplish in a quantitative manner. Micro-level studies typically use qualitative methods due to the unavailability of data. By using a database with geocoded attacks, like the GTD, combined with the development of terrorism-specific risk indicators, entirely original research on the spatial dynamics of terrorism becomes possible. This would provide insight into the spatial attributes of terrorist hotspots, like Baghdad or Benghazi, to help understand what makes these areas opportunistic for terrorists. Furthermore, RTM does not assume that one pattern of terrorism would hold across multiple environments. Instead, RTM shows that each location has a unique combination of spatial and situational contexts that influence the risks of terrorism. In terms of methodology, a mixed quantitative and qualitative approach would be the most effective. A set of three to four most different case studies would provide the basis for regions studied, such as the Kashmir region of India, the Philippines, Chechnya, and Baghdad as an example set of locations. The next step would involve leveraging attack data from the GTD to identify areas that feature high levels of terrorist activity at the city level, and then at a block level. RTM could then provide insight toward the specific risk indicators in each city examined, which could then be compared to see how different regions experience risks in similar or different ways.
Recommendations for Future RTM and Terrorism
Future application of RTM to terrorism will require significant work. The development of a set of risk indicators unique to terrorism is necessary. The subnational risk indicators for armed conflict provide a foundation to build from; however, the supporting literature needs further development. Nearly all of the subnational risk indicators for armed conflict are based on studies limited to Africa (Buhaug and Rød 2006) . Gassebner and Luechinger (2011) assess the robustness of previous findings on the determinants of terrorism, reassessing the effect of 65 proposed correlates. This study could provide a starting point for selection of risk indicators for terrorism (e.g., logged gross domestic product per capita, secondary school enrollment, government consumption, fuel exports). Data from the World Bank can be used for national risk factors. In addition, attack data from multiple databases will need cross-referencing to develop a clearer picture of areas that suffer from high levels of terrorism. For example, cross-referencing attacks in the GTD with a regional specific database, such as the SATP, can provide a more accurate picture of high attack regions. One issue to address will be precise locations for attacks. The GTD is one of the only databases that geocodes attacks; however, these geocodes are not always exact, making precise RTM at the block level unreliable. One method to counter imprecise geocodes is to cross-reference attacks with available police reports, which has been proven to provide more accurate information (Behlendorf et al. 2016) . These steps will all need to be accomplished before testing RTM for terrorism.
Conclusion
This paper addressed existing gaps in current terrorism research while providing support for another project. The current literature on VEOs is insufficient to differentiate between violent extremism and terrorism. The selection of regions and terrorist groups to study contribute to a larger project, focused on using statistical methods to estimate terrorism risks. The selection follows a most different system by location and group, resulting in unique locations and groups selected: FARC in Colombia, ISIL in Iraq, ISIL in Libya, and LeT in India (see Appendix A). Terrorism databases, which are a major part of quantitative studies, provide insight toward attack trends and patterns.
Comparing existing, open source databases provide a resource to help guide users toward the database that best suits their research needs. RTM, originally developed for crime analysis, could become a new methodology for conducting original research on terrorism at the micro level; however, current literature is still far behind providing robust information for RTM to effectively use.
Terrorism-specific risk indicators need development, with empirical support that is generalizable at a global scale. Accurately geocoded attacks are also needed to pinpoint attack locations for diagnosing how the geographic features of locations influence those attacks. Given the growth of violent extremism in policy circles, the academic field should catch up over the next five to ten years, creating new research on violent extremism and CVE.
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